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Abstract
Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. Current
theories suggest that people should be especially inclined to accept generics that involve threaten-
ing information. However, previous tests of this claim have focused on generics about non-human
categories, which raises the question of whether this effect applies as readily to human categories.
In Experiment 1, adults were more likely to accept generics involving a threatening (vs. a non-
threatening) property for artifacts, but this negativity bias did not also apply to human categories.
Experiment 2 examined an alternative hypothesis for this result, and Experiments 3 and 4 served
as conceptual replications of the first experiment. Experiment 5 found that even preschoolers apply
generics differently for humans and artifacts. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that these effects
reflect differences between human and non-human categories more generally, as adults showed a
negativity bias for categories of non-human animals, but not for categories of humans. These find-
ings suggest the presence of important, early-emerging domain differences in people’s judgments
about generics.
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1. Introduction
Consider the following statement: “Sharks attack people.” This is a generic statement
—that is, a statement that expresses a generalization about an entire category (Carlson,
1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Gelman, 2003; Leslie, 2008). Many people consider this
statement to be true, despite knowing that the vast majority of sharks never attack people.
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Now, consider the following statement: “Men attack people.” In fact, the proportion of
men who attack people is greater than the proportion of sharks that do so, yet many peo-
ple would disagree with this second statement. This intuition illustrates the hypothesis
investigated here: namely, that there may be important differences in the acceptability of
generic statements that express dangerous, harmful, or threatening information about
human versus non-human categories.
Recent theoretical work suggests that because generic sentences serve as a linguistic
outlet for our conceptual representations, people should be especially inclined to accept
generics that involve dangerous, harmful, or threatening (henceforth, “threatening”) infor-
mation (Leslie, 2008, in press). For example, witnessing a single instance of a shark
attacking a person should lead to the conclusion that “Sharks attack people” because
undergeneralizing such information could have profound consequences. Initial evidence
for this proposal demonstrated that generic statements about non-human categories are
indeed sensitive to the content of the properties being generalized (Cimpian, Brandone, &
Gelman, 2010). Participants were more likely to accept generics expressing threatening
properties of animals (e.g., “Zorbs have venomous purple feathers”) than neutral proper-
ties (e.g., “Zorbs have purple feathers”), even when the statistical evidence for these
statements was perfectly matched (e.g., 30% of zorbs display the relevant property). Thus,
threatening information holds a privileged status in how we represent kinds.
The proposal that people have a tendency to rapidly generalize threatening information
raises the further question of whether such a tendency also influences how we reason
about categories of humans. For example, just as it takes only a few shark attacks for
people to endorse the corresponding generic (“Sharks attack people”), does it likewise
take the threatening actions of just a few members of a social group (e.g., men attacking
individuals) for people to hold a general belief about the entire group in generic form
(i.e., “Men attack people”)? In other words, is the tendency to readily accept generics
about threatening properties a domain-general fact about generic statements or, alterna-
tively, might generics about human categories be in some way distinctive?
Consistent with the former possibility, a number of studies have documented that peo-
ple show a negativity bias in judgments about humans (i.e., bad impressions are quicker
to form and are more stable than good ones; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, &
Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). Such evi-
dence suggests that, with respect to generics, human categories would be treated like the
animal categories investigated in prior work. On the other hand, it might be that people
have a distinctive approach to thinking about humans that differs in important respects
from the way they think about categories of other types. In particular, people tend to con-
clude that there is some deeper sense in which humans are fundamentally good (Newman,
Bloom, & Knobe, 2014). Even when participants are told explicitly that a particular
human being consistently has morally bad desires and performs morally bad actions, they
still show a tendency to conclude that, deep down, there is some core essential part of
this human being that is good. In combination with the fact that generic statements are
typically interpreted as expressing deep, essential properties (e.g., Carlson & Pelletier,
1995; Cimpian & Cadena, 2010; Cimpian & Markman, 2009, 2011; Gelman, 2004;
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Lyons, 1977), this may mean that people would not endorse generics that involve threat-
ening properties more than those that involve non-threatening ones for human categories,
in contrast with their generic judgments about non-human categories.
In this investigation, we explored the generality of the previously hypothesized ten-
dency to accept generics about threatening properties more easily than other generics. In
particular, we asked whether people endorse generic statements about threatening proper-
ties more than about non-threatening ones for human categories, in much the same way
as they do for non-human categories. Six experiments explored this issue. Experiment 1
tested whether people endorse generics similarly or differently for novel human and non-
human (specifically, artifact) categories. This experiment revealed a tendency to accept
generics involving threatening information (more than non-threatening information) for
novel artifact categories but not novel human categories. Experiment 2 examined an alter-
native hypothesis regarding expectations about base rates in the different domains (i.e.,
are people assumed to differ from artifacts in how dangerous they are?), and Experiments
3 and 4 served as conceptual replications of the first experiment. Experiment 5 examined
preschoolers’ endorsement of generic statements and found that children, like adults,
show different patterns for human versus artifact categories. Because young children,
unlike adults, are generally not concerned with appearing unbiased when explicitly rea-
soning about social categories (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007; Apfel-
baum, Pauker, Ambady, Sommers, & Norton, 2008), there is reason to conclude that an
absence of a negativity bias for human categories in their responses would not be due to
a strategy of avoiding the appearance of prejudice. Finally, Experiment 6 explored
whether the effects from the previous experiments are restricted to comparisons between
humans and artifacts, or whether they extend to comparisons of humans and non-human
categories more generally. This experiment demonstrated that whereas adults once again
did not accept generics more for threatening versus non-threatening information for
humans, they did do so for categories of non-human animals, thus treating non-human
animals in much the same way as artifacts in the previous experiments. Together, these
studies suggest important differences in people’s evaluation of generics about human and
non-human categories.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Four-hundred adults (286 men, 114 women; M = 26 years; range = 18–69 years) com-
pleted the study online for 10 cents each via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
2.1.2. Procedure
Each participant was assigned to a valence (dangerous or wonderful), a domain (peo-
ple or tools), and a prevalence (varying from 10% to 100% in increments of 10). We
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examined opposing valences and chose tools for a non-human category as an exten-
sion of previous work that contrasted threatening and neutral information about non-
human animal categories (Cimpian et al., 2010). Participants received and evaluated a
single statement that embodied a particular combination of the three factors (valence,
domain, and prevalence), with reference to a novel category (Krens/krens). For
example:
Imagine that there is a land far away where you can find people (tools) called Krens
(krens). Below, you will read some information about Krens (krens).
30% of Krens (krens) are dangerous (wonderful).
How true is the following sentence about these people (tools)?
Krens are dangerous (wonderful).
After reading the statement, participants evaluated it on a seven-point scale anchored
by not true at all (1) and completely true (7).
2.2. Results and discussion
We conducted a multiple regression with valence, domain, prevalence, and all their
two- and three-way interactions as predictors. All predictors were mean centered to facili-
tate interpretation of the coefficients; we report standardized coefficients. Valence was a
significant predictor of participants’ truth ratings, b = .16, p < .001, indicating that gen-
eric sentences regarding a threatening property (M = 4.49) were judged to be true more
often than those regarding a non-threatening property (M = 3.97). In addition, prevalence
significantly predicted truth ratings, b = .63, p < .001, with generics being judged to be
true more often as the prevalence level increased. This analysis also yielded a
domain 9 valence interaction, b = .09, p = .018, which is consistent with the prediction
that participants’ evaluation of generic statements differed significantly by domain. No
other coefficients were significant.
Given the interaction, we conducted a separate regression in each domain. Consistent
with prior work, generic statements involving tools were judged to be true more often
when they described threatening (M = 4.69) than non-threatening (M = 3.86) properties,
b = .24, p < .001; see Fig. 1A. By contrast, for generics involving people, there was no
significant difference between threatening (M = 4.29) and non-threatening (M = 4.07)
properties, b = .07, p = .24; see Fig. 1B.
In total, these findings provide initial support for the idea that people differentiate
between human and non-human (tool) categories when evaluating generic sentences
involving threatening (dangerous) and non-threatening (wonderful) properties.
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3. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 found a difference in how people evaluate generic sentences about
human and non-human (tool) categories. It is possible, however, that this finding could
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Fig. 1. (A) Participants’ mean ratings of the truth of the generic statement, on a scale of 1–7, for the category of
“tools” in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error. (B) Participants’ mean ratings of the truth of the gen-
eric statement, on a scale of 1–7, for the category of “people” in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error.
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simply reflect a difference in base rates of certain properties within human versus non-
human categories, rather than fundamental differences in the acceptability of generic
statements in these domains. As has been noted previously, people’s intuitions about the
acceptability of describing a particular category using a generic depend not only on the
prevalence of a property within that category but also on its prevalence in other cate-
gories (Cohen, 1999). For example, consider the sentence “Bulgarians are good weightlif-
ters.” To the extent that people regard this sentence as true, it is not because they think
that the absolute percentage of Bulgarians who are good weightlifters is itself high, but
rather because they think that the percentage is high relative to the percentages found for
other nationalities. Thus, if humans are generally assumed to be more dangerous than
tools, then the threatening information in Experiment 1 would be relatively more distinc-
tive for the tool categories than for the human categories (relative to their respective
baselines), which might, in turn, make the threatening generics about tools (vs. humans)
more acceptable (see also Cimpian et al., 2010).
Note, however, that the same difference in base rates could also make the generic less
acceptable: If humans are generally assumed to be more dangerous than tools, then par-
ticipants may more readily conclude that a new category of humans is dangerous. Either
way, differences in base rates would introduce uncertainty in the interpretation of the
results from Experiment 1. To investigate this issue, in Experiment 2, we asked partici-
pants to report their baseline expectations about whether tools and people exhibit threat-
ening versus non-threatening properties.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Three hundred twenty-three adults (223 men, 100 women; M = 28 years; age
range = 18–67 years) completed the study online for 10 cents via MTurk.
3.1.2. Procedure
Each participant was assigned to a valence (dangerous or helpful) and a domain (peo-
ple, tools, or things). We changed the non-threatening property from “wonderful” to
“helpful” because the latter is more closely matched to the threatening property used in
our experiments (i.e., both “dangerous” and “helpful” entities have a direct impact on
others). In addition, we included things as a domain because it is a more superordinate
category than tools, and it is thus better matched with people. This domain could thus be
used for a tighter comparison with people in subsequent experiments, especially if the
base rates are also similar (see Experiments 3–5 below).
Participants responded to a single question asking what percentage of the relevant cate-
gory’s members possesses the relevant property. For example:
Imagine that there is a land far away where you can find people (things, tools) called
Merts (merts). What percentage of Merts (merts) do you think are dangerous (helpful)?
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After reading the question, participants were asked to enter a number between 0 and
100.
3.2. Results and discussion
Results are displayed in Table 1. A 3 (domain) 9 2 (valence) ANOVA did not yield an
interaction between domain and valence, F(2, 317) = 1.14, p = .32, which argues against
domain differences in baseline rates of threatening or non-threatening properties. We nev-
ertheless conducted two follow-up analyses to check for domain differences separately
for dangerous (threatening) and helpful (non-threatening) expectations.
When asked to predict what percentage of Merts (merts) are dangerous, there was a
significant effect of domain, F(2, 158) = 3.30, p = .039, g2p ¼ :04. Participants judged
tools (M = 36%) to be more dangerous than people (M = 25%), t(105) = 2.20, p = .03,
and things (M = 25%), t(105) = 2.11, p = .04. There was no difference between the latter
two categories, t(106) = 0.08, p = .94. In contrast, estimations regarding helpfulness did
not differ by domain (people: M = 61%, things: M = 58%, and tools: M = 63%), F(2,
159) = 0.45, p = .64.
To speculate, the lower base rate of dangerousness for people (vs. tools) may have
made it more likely for participants in the previous experiment to agree with generics
about human (vs. tool) categories that involve threatening information. For example,
learning that 50% of people in a category are dangerous presents a starker contrast to the
presumed base rates of dangerousness among humans than learning that 50% of tools in
a category are dangerous. This starker contrast could have led participants to readily con-
clude that this category of people is dangerous, which would have made it easier to find
a negativity bias for human categories. In light of these considerations, it may be particu-
larly revealing that we found no negativity bias for these categories. On the other hand,
the lower base rate of dangerousness for people (vs. tools) may have made it more likely
that participants would judge that a new category of tools is dangerous because tools are
generally assumed to be dangerous (at least relative to people).
Regardless, to avoid any interpretive issues due to differences in base rates, in Experi-
ment 3 we provide a more controlled test of the potential differences in participants’ eval-
uation of generics about human versus non-human categories. Specifically, the
comparable base rates for the domains of people and things (see Table 1) permit such a
controlled test of people’s judgments about generic sentences across domains.
Table 1
Participants’ mean estimations, on a scale of 1–100, of the dangerousness and helpfulness of the three
domains in Experiment 2
Dangerous Helpful
People 25 (22) 61 (18)
Things 25 (27) 58 (27)
Tools 36 (30) 63 (24)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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4. Experiment 3
Experiment 3 served as a conceptual replication of the first experiment. We contrasted
people with things in this experiment, given their comparable level of generality and their
equivalent base rates in Experiment 2. We also contrasted dangerous with helpful, as
these attributes are more closely matched to one another than dangerous and wonderful.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Eight hundred adults (439 men, 361 women; M = 30 years; age range = 18–72 years)
completed the study online for 10 cents each on MTurk. The sample size was doubled
relative to Experiment 1 to provide a high-powered conceptual replication.
4.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with two exceptions: The non-human
category was labeled as things, and the non-threatening property was helpful instead of
wonderful.
4.2. Results and discussion
We conducted a multiple regression with valence, domain, prevalence, and all their
two- and three-way interactions as predictors. All predictors were mean centered to facili-
tate interpretation of the coefficients; we report standardized coefficients. Valence was
again a significant predictor of participants’ truth ratings, b = .08, p < .001, as was
prevalence, b = .80, p < .001. Unlike in Experiment 1, this analysis did not yield a sig-
nificant domain 9 valence interaction, b = .03, p = .15.1 No other coefficients were sig-
nificant.
Despite the non-significant domain 9 valence interaction, we looked separately at the
results for each domain. As in Experiment 1, generic statements involving non-human
entities (things) were judged to be true more often when they described threatening
(M = 4.71) than non-threatening (M = 4.36) properties, b = .11, p < .001; see Fig. 2A.
For generics involving people, there was no significant difference between threatening
(M = 4.50) and non-threatening (M = 4.34) properties, b = .05, p = .09; see Fig. 2B.
Taken together, these findings provide additional support for the idea that people show
a negativity bias in judgments about categories of artifacts, but not categories of humans.
5. Experiment 4
Experiment 4 investigated adults’ judgments about generics for human and non-human
categories using a visual task that could be employed with children (see Experiment 5).
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Fig. 2. (A) Participants’ mean ratings of the truth of the generic statement, on a scale of 1–7, for the cate-
gory of “things” in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error. (B) Participants’ mean ratings of the
truth of the generic statement, on a scale of 1–7, for the category of “people” in Experiment 3. Error bars
represent standard error.
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5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
Sixty-four adults (28 men, 36 women; M = 23 years; range = 18–52 years) from the
New Haven community participated for $2 each.
5.1.2. Procedure
Participants were tested in person and individually on the campus of Yale University.
We adapted a method from Brandone, Gelman, and Hedglen (2015) that was used to
examine preschoolers’ and adults’ intuitions regarding the semantics of generic state-
ments. Each participant was assigned to a domain (people or things). The study consisted
of two blocks differing in valence (dangerous vs. helpful). These blocks were separated
with a distractor task (the memory game Simon), which participants played for 2 min.
Within each block, there were four different, novel kinds. For each kind, six exemplars
were depicted (see Figs. 3 and 4). The number of exemplars within each sample exhibit-
ing the property involved in the generic (dangerous or helpful) varied, with four preva-
lence levels: 0 of 6 (0%), 2 of 6 (33%), 4 of 6 (67%), and 6 of 6 (100%). Although our
main focus was on the intermediate prevalence levels (33% and 67%), we included the
0% and 100% prevalence levels as a way of ascertaining that participants properly under-
stood the task. In other words, we expected participants to largely disagree with the gen-
eric at the 0% prevalence level and largely agree with the generic at the 100%
prevalence level. The novel kinds were rotated throughout the blocks, across participants
(e.g., “krens” were presented at each prevalence level equally often, across participants).
Participants were asked to circle whether a corresponding statement (e.g., “Krens are dan-
gerous”) was “right” or “wrong” about each kind. Block order was counterbalanced using
a Latin Square design.
At the beginning of each block, participants were provided with a sheet of instructions
explaining which exemplars corresponded to which attributes (e.g., “A person that looks
like this is dangerous; he has a dangerous face”; “A person that looks like this is helpful;
he has a helpful face”; “A thing that looks like this is dangerous; it has sharp spikes”; “A
thing that looks like this is helpful; it has a soft brush”). Exemplars lacking the relevant
properties were described as not being dangerous (e.g., “A person that looks like this is
not dangerous; he does not have a dangerous face”) or helpful (e.g., “A person that looks
like this is not helpful; he does not have a helpful face”).
5.2. Results and discussion
As expected, participants largely disagreed with the generic at the 0% prevalence level
(M = 100% “wrong” responses) and largely agreed with the generic at the 100% preva-
lence level (M = 97% “right” responses).
Because the design involved a dichotomous dependent measure, a repeated-measures
binary logistic regression (RM-BLR) was conducted, with domain (people vs. things;
between subjects), valence (dangerous vs. helpful; within subject), prevalence (33% and
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67%; within subject), and their two- and three-way interactions as predictors. The RM-
BLR revealed a main effect of domain, Wald v2 = 11.16, df = 1, p = .001, indicating
that participants were more willing to endorse generics about things (M = 65%) than peo-
ple (M = 39%), as well as a significant effect of prevalence, Wald v2 = 60.79, df = 1,
p < .001, indicating that generic sentences were more acceptable for higher than lower
Fig. 3. (A) Sample category of things (“krens”) showing target feature (“dangerous”) at each of the four
prevalence levels (0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%). (B) Sample category of people (“Krens”) showing target fea-
ture (“dangerous”) at each of the four prevalence levels (0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%).
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prevalence levels. There was no significant effect of valence (Mdangerous = 57%;
Mhelpful = 47%), Wald v
2 = 3.21, df = 1, p = .073. Importantly, this analysis also yielded
the predicted interaction between domain and valence, Wald v2 = 7.58, df = 1, p = .006;
see Fig. 5. No other effects were significant.
Given the domain 9 valence interaction, we looked separately at the results for each
domain. For generic sentences about things, statements involving a threatening property
Fig. 4. (A) Sample category of things (“krens”) showing target feature (“helpful”) at each of the four preva-
lence levels (0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%). (B) Sample category of people (“Krens”) showing target feature
(“helpful”) at each of the four prevalence levels (0%, 33%, 67%, and 100%).
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(M = 78%) were endorsed more than statements involving a non-threatening property
(M = 52%), Wald v2 = 8.87, df = 1, p = .003. By contrast, for generic sentences about
people, there was no difference between threatening (M = 36%) and non-threatening
(M = 42%) properties, Wald v2 = 0.55, df = 1, p = .46. This asymmetry between the
acceptability of threatening (vs. non-threatening) generics about human and non-human
categories replicates the findings reported in Experiments 1 and 3.
In sum, these findings provide further evidence that adults treat generic sentences dif-
ferently for categories of humans and non-humans, as in Experiments 1 and 3. Next, we
investigate whether young children also show differences in their evaluations of generics
for human and non-human categories.
6. Experiment 5
Experiments 1, 3, and 4 find that adults’ judgments concerning generic statements dif-
fer between human and non-human categories. We have suggested that this result reflects
conceptual differences in the kinds of generalizations that people make across domains.
An alternative interpretation, however, is that participants in the previous experiments
were simply concerned about appearing biased and were thus unwilling to (openly)
endorse generics involving threatening information about categories of people. To explore
this possibility, we tested young children in Experiment 5 because they are generally far
less concerned than adults with appearing unbiased when explicitly reasoning about social
categories (e.g., Abrams et al., 2007; Apfelbaum et al., 2008). Thus, if children show the
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Fig. 5. Mean percentage of “right” responses in Experiment 4, by domain and valence. Error bars represent
standard error.
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same domain difference in their judgments about generics as adults did, it seems less
likely that such an asymmetry could be attributed to concerns about appearing unbiased.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
Sixty-four preschoolers (31 boys, 33 girls; M = 4.81 years; age range = 4.18–
5.99 years) participated in the study. Participants were recruited from the greater New
Haven, Connecticut, area and tested individually in a quiet room at their preschool. Two
additional children were tested but excluded because they provided the same response
across all eight trials.
6.1.2. Procedure
The same procedure and materials from Experiment 4 were used, with several modifi-
cations to make the task more appropriate for young children. First, we framed the study
as a game. We introduced Newton, a puppet from outer space who gets confused, so
sometimes he says things that are right and sometimes he says things that are wrong.
Children were told that their job in the game was to decide if what Newton says is right
or wrong. Second, the task began with four practice trials used to convey the options of
“right” and “wrong” in the context of the task (e.g., the experimenter showed a picture of
a banana, which Newton said was an apple, and children were asked if Newton was right
or wrong). Third, we included a training phase at the beginning of each block in which
children were told which items depicted dangerous (or helpful) items. For children
assigned to the domain of things, dangerous things were described as having sharp spikes
and non-dangerous things as not having sharp spikes (see Fig. 3A); helpful things were
described as having a soft brush and non-helpful things as not having a soft brush (see
Fig. 4A). For children assigned to the domain of people, dangerous people were
described as having a dangerous face and non-dangerous people as not having a danger-
ous face (see Fig. 3B); helpful people were described as having a helpful face and non-
helpful people as not having a helpful face (see Fig. 4B). The experimenter then showed
children four new types of things (or people) and asked children to identify whether each
item was dangerous or helpful. Training ended only after the child responded to each
item correctly. Fourth, we read the generic statements to the children (e.g., “Krens are
dangerous”), rather than having children read them (as adults did in the previous experi-
ment); children were then asked to identify each statement as “right” or “wrong.” Finally,
we introduced a child-friendly distractor game, which participants played on an iPad for
2 min in between the two blocks.
6.2. Results and discussion
As expected, participants largely disagreed with the generic at the 0% prevalence level
(M = 87% “wrong” responses) and largely agreed with the generic at the 100% preva-
lence level (M = 92% “right” responses).
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As in Experiment 4, a RM-BLR with domain (people vs. things; between subjects),
valence (dangerous vs. helpful; within subject), prevalence (33% and 67%; within sub-
ject), and their two- and three-way interactions as predictors was conducted. The RM-
BLR did not reveal a significant effect of domain (Mthings = 66%; Mpeople = 59%), Wald
v2 = 1.41, df = 1, p = .23, suggesting that children did not accept generic statements
more in one domain than another. In addition, there was a marginal effect of prevalence,
Wald v2 = 3.37, df = 1, p = .066, and no significant effect of valence
(Mdangerous = 59%; Mhelpful = 66%), Wald v
2 = 1.02, df = 1, p = .31. This analysis also
revealed an interaction between valence and prevalence, Wald v2 = 3.97, df = 1,
p = .046, and, importantly, the predicted interaction between domain and valence, Wald
v2 = 5.59, df = 1, p = .018; see Fig. 6. No other effects were significant.
Given the domain 9 valence interaction, we looked separately at the results for each
domain. Children did not differentiate between threatening (M = 70%) and non-threaten-
ing statements (M = 63%) when judging generics about things, Wald v2 = 0.92, df = 1,
p = .34. However, when judging generics about people, children accepted non-threatening
statements (M = 70%) more than threatening statements (M = 47%), Wald v2 = 5.70,
df = 1, p = .017.
Taken together, these findings suggest that children, like adults, show an asymmetry in
how they think about categories of humans and non-humans. However, the pattern of
children’s responses in this experiment differed from that displayed by adults in the pre-
vious experiments. For adults, the valence effect was within the domain of artifacts,
whereby generics involving threatening information were endorsed more than those
involving non-threatening information. By contrast, for children, the valence effect was
within the domain of humans, whereby generics involving non-threatening information
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Fig. 6. Mean percentage of “right” responses in Experiment 5, by domain and valence. Error bars represent
standard error.
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were endorsed more than those involving threatening information. This positivity advan-
tage among children is consistent with previous work showing a positivity bias in their
reasoning about personality traits, whereby children generalize positive information more
readily than negative information about other people (Boseovski, 2010).
A potential alternative explanation for these findings is that perhaps children thought
that the neutral human characters looked more likely to be capable of being helpful than
dangerous, which could explain why children were more likely to endorse generics
involving non-threatening information for human categories. However, this account
would predict that at the 0% prevalence level, children should also be more likely to
endorse the non-threatening generic than the threatening generic for humans. In fact,
however, there was no difference at the 0% prevalence level between the threatening
generic (1 of 32 children said “right”) and the non-threatening one (2 of 32 children said
“right”).
Moreover, it is notable that children did not show a negativity bias in their generic
judgments about artifacts; indeed, children accepted generic statements involving threat-
ening and non-threatening properties at comparable rates. One explanation of this null
difference is that the artifacts used in this study were unfamiliar to children, who may
not have known what to think of them. Moreover, the use of the label “things” might
have increased the novelty of the artifacts and, as a result, children may not have been
able to effectively reason about them, unlike human categories that are familiar to chil-
dren. Of course, it may also be that the absence of a negativity bias speaks to an absence
of a negativity bias in children’s generic judgments more generally. Although additional
research is needed to address this issue, these findings suggest the presence of early-emer-
ging domain differences in people’s judgments about generic statements.
7. Experiment 6
The experiments reported thus far demonstrate consistent domain differences in the
evaluation of generic statements, but the precise nature of this domain difference remains
unclear. Experiments 1–5 presented a rather stark contrast between humans on the one
hand and artifacts on the other, a distinction that is consistent with a variety of concep-
tual distinctions (e.g., living vs. non-living, animate vs. inanimate, human vs. non-
human), all of which are available to both adults and young children (e.g., Hirschfeld &
Gelman, 1994). An important next step is to clarify the basis of the demonstrated effects.
In this context, animals provide a critical contrast because they are distinct from humans
but, like humans, are both living and animate. Contrasting humans with non-human ani-
mals provides a minimal pair that will shed light on the conceptual basis of the phe-
nomenon established in the prior studies. Thus, in Experiment 6, we assess adults’
generic interpretations concerning novel categories of humans versus non-human animals.
In addition, we included a broader range of threatening and non-threatening properties, to
assess the generality of the effects.
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7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
Two hundred adults (121 men, 79 women; M = 35 years; age range = 18–72 years)
completed the study online for 60 cents each on MTurk.
7.1.2. Procedure
Each participant was assigned to a domain (people or animals). The study consisted of
two blocks differing in valence (threatening vs. non-threatening). These blocks were sepa-
rated with an anagram task, which participants played for 2 min. At the beginning of
each block, participants were asked to imagine faraway lands where they could find peo-
ple or animals. Within each block, there were five different, novel kinds. Five different
properties were used in the threatening block (dangerous, harmful, hostile, mean, and
threatening), and five different properties were used in the non-threatening block (com-
forting, friendly, gentle, helpful, and nice). The percentage of the kind exhibiting the
property involved in the generic (e.g., hostile) varied, with five prevalence levels: 10%,
30%, 50%, 70%, and 90%. The novel kinds were rotated throughout the blocks, across
participants (i.e., each property was presented at each prevalence level equally often,
across participants). Participants were asked to indicate whether a corresponding state-
ment (e.g., “Krens are gentle”) was “true” or “false” about each kind. Block order was
counterbalanced using a Latin Square design.
7.2. Results and discussion
Participants’ true/false judgments were analyzed with a multilevel logistic regression
model that allowed each subject’s intercept to vary randomly. Domain (dichotomous),
valence (dichotomous), and prevalence (continuous), as well as all their two- and three-
way interactions, were included as independent variables. This analysis revealed a main
effect of valence, b = .34, SE = .14, z = 2.39, p = .017, indicating that participants were
more willing to endorse generics about threatening (M = 59%) than non-threatening prop-
erties (M = 54%), as well as a significant effect of prevalence, b = .09, SE = .004,
z = 20.91, p < .001, indicating that generic sentences were more acceptable for higher
than lower prevalence levels. There was no significant effect of domain (Ms = 56% and
57% for humans and animals, respectively), b = .09, SE = .27, z = 0.31, p = .75. Criti-
cally, this analysis also revealed the predicted interaction between domain and valence,
b = .64, SE = .29, z = 2.23, p = .026. No other effects were significant.
Given the domain 9 valence interaction, we looked separately at the results for each
domain. Consistent with prior work (Cimpian et al., 2010), generic statements about non-
human animals were judged true more often when the properties were threatening
(M = 60%) than when they were non-threatening (M = 53%), b = .08, SE = .02,
z = 3.76, p < .001; see Fig. 7A. In contrast, and as predicted by our hypothesis, the bias
for threatening information did not hold when participants evaluated generic statements
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Fig. 7. (A) Mean percentage of “true” responses, by prevalence and valence, for the category of “animals”
in Experiment 6. Error bars represent standard error. (B) Mean percentage of “true” responses, by prevalence
and valence, for the category of “people” in Experiment 6. Error bars represent standard error.
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about people (Ms = 57% and 56% for threatening and non-threatening properties, respec-
tively), b = .02, SE = .02, z = 0.69, p = .49; see Fig. 7B.
Taken together, these findings support the interpretation that domain differences in
people’s evaluation of generic statements reflect a difference between human and non-
human categories, and not either an animate/inanimate or living/non-living distinction.
Moreover, given the range of properties tested, it seems that the current findings hold
across the sets of threatening and non-threatening properties as a whole.
8. General discussion
The current experiments suggest that people’s judgments about generic statements for
human categories are systematically different from their judgments about generic state-
ments for non-human categories. For non-human categories, people are more inclined to
accept generics involving threatening properties than non-threatening properties even
when those properties have precisely the same prevalence levels. However, this differ-
ence does not arise for human categories. Instead, for human categories, adults accepted
generic statements involving threatening and non-threatening information at comparable
rates (Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 6). Domain differences in people’s evaluation of generics
were not merely due to differences in assumed base rates for threatening versus non-
threatening properties across human and non-human categories (Experiments 3 and 4), or
were they likely due to social desirability: Even 4-year-olds’ endorsement of generic
statements showed domain differences; in fact, children were more willing to accept non-
threatening than threatening information in generic form about human categories (Experi-
ment 5).
Although the current findings consistently show that people evaluate generic statements
differently for human versus non-human categories, it is notable that the size of the effect
varied across our experiments. The domain 9 valence interaction was small (Experiments
1 and 6) and non-significant (Experiment 3) for the studies conducted on MTurk, but lar-
ger and quite robust for the studies conducted in person (Experiments 4 and 5). One
potential explanation for this difference is that Experiments 1, 3, and 6 were conducted
online and, as a result, may have reduced concerns about appearing biased. However, this
explanation is inconsistent with the finding that even preschoolers show the effect, as they
are unlikely to be concerned about appearing biased. Another potential explanation for
this difference is that Experiments 1, 3, and 6 provided neither pictures nor descriptions
of the novel entities in question (as in Experiments 4 and 5), so all that was known was
their membership in a superordinate category (animals, people, things, or tools). Without
further information, participants may have felt hard pressed to make firm judgments of
the novel categories. (This is in contrast to previous work, which provided participants
with descriptions of the novel category members; Cimpian et al., 2010.) In contrast, par-
ticipants in Experiments 4 and 5 were provided with pictures, which may have facilitated
more stable category representations.
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8.1. Explaining the effect
We turn next to possible explanations for the differences observed between human and
non-human categories. One possibility stems from a dual-process framework suggesting
that intuition and reflection interact to produce decisions (Frederick, 2005; Kahneman,
2011; Sloman, 1996). Stereotypes are automatically activated but can be overridden with
sufficient motivation (Devine, 1989). Perhaps, in the context of our task, participants’
immediate intuitions about human categories showed the same negativity bias found for
non-human categories, but they were then overridden using a more controlled, analytic
form of cognition. On this account, participants truly disagreed with generics involving
threatening information about human categories (rather than just pretending that they dis-
agreed to appear unbiased), but they may have only reached this conclusion after overrid-
ing their initial impulse to regard those generics as correct.
However, the current results provide at least some evidence against this hypothesis.
Across a variety of phenomena, researchers have found that when adults are drawn
toward one response by intuition and to another response by careful reasoning, children
tend to be drawn more toward the response that is characteristic of intuition in adults
(e.g., Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Eidson & Coley, 2014; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar,
2004; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009). Strikingly, these experiments do not find that children
differ from adults by being more inclined to endorse generic statements involving threat-
ening properties about human categories. This developmental result provides at least
some evidence against the hypothesis that the effect observed in adults arises from a pro-
cess whereby participants used controlled reasoning to overcome initial intuitions. Still, it
would be fruitful for future research to further investigate this dual-process explanation
(e.g., by looking at responses under cognitive load or at speeded reactions).
Another possibility is that, even at the level of immediate intuition, people do not
endorse generic statements in the same way for human and non-human categories. In
other words, it might be that people’s intuitive way of making sense of human categories
is different in some important respect from their way of making sense of non-human cat-
egories. Then, as a result, it might be that people’s intuitions truly do not show the same
negativity bias for human categories as they show for non-human categories. For exam-
ple, existing research indicates that people show a tendency to think that, deep down,
human beings are drawn to behave in ways that are morally good (Newman et al., 2014).
Of course, people recognize that human beings often behave in ways that are morally
bad, but even in such cases, they show a tendency to posit a deeper “true self” that is
morally good (Newman, De Freitas, & Knobe, 2015). Perhaps it is this belief about
humans’ fundamental goodness that explains the difference we observe between human
and non-human categories, especially given that generic statements are assumed to con-
vey deep, essential properties (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Cimpian & Cadena, 2010; Cim-
pian & Markman, 2009, 2011; Gelman, 2004; Lyons, 1977). Importantly, it seems that
children may show this belief to an even greater extent than adults do. For example, chil-
dren say that another’s goodness is more stable than their badness (Heyman & Dweck,
1998) and that a person is good, despite all evidence suggesting otherwise (Rholes &
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Ruble, 1986). If this belief is indeed more robust in childhood than adulthood, that might
explain the findings in Experiment 5, where children were more likely to accept generics
involving non-threatening rather than threatening properties about human categories.
8.2. Generics and stereotyping
Finally, an important question to consider is how to reconcile the current results with
the pervasiveness of prejudice and negative stereotyping in everyday life. Stereotypes can
be thought of as generic judgments about human categories (Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen,
2004), so the current findings may seem at odds with this negative aspect of social
cognition.
To begin with, it is important to emphasize that the present results do not in any way
call into question existing findings about prejudice and negative stereotypes. Rather, what
these results suggest is that there is something about the cognitive processes underlying
generic generalizations in particular such that negative stereotypes do not affect these
processes in the same way they affect other aspects of cognition. For example, it seems
plausible that many people hold a negative stereotype of Italians as mobsters, and that
they would show many of the effects that social psychologists have identified as indexing
stereotyping and prejudice. However, we suspect that few people would endorse the gen-
eric statement, “Italians are mobsters.” If this gap between stereotypes and generic
endorsement does turn out to be the case, it would not give us reason to reject the
hypothesis that people have negative stereotypes about Italians, but rather would provide
evidence that these negative stereotypes do not affect generic generalizations in the same
way they affect other aspects of cognition.
Why should generics differ from other aspects of cognition? One possibility may fol-
low from the observation that generics are specifically understood to express deep, essen-
tial properties (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Cimpian & Cadena, 2010; Cimpian &
Markman, 2009, 2011; Gelman, 2004; Lyons, 1977). Recent research has found that peo-
ple have a tendency to think that humans are essentially good (i.e., that there is some
deeper essence within humans drawing them to do the right thing; Newman et al., 2014,
2015). Strikingly, this tendency arises even when reasoning about members of outgroups
who are negatively stereotyped. Even when people hold clearly negative views about
members of such outgroups, they still show a tendency to think that, deep down, there is
something more essential in these outgroup members that is calling them toward the good
(De Freitas & Cikara, 2016). If this idea of a “good essence” is an aspect of how people
think about outgroups, and if generic generalizations have a privileged connection with
this essentialist idea, then perhaps it is not surprising that generics about social groups
are less negative than other types of generic judgments.
Further research could ask whether there are any conditions under which this effect
does not arise. Perhaps the typical negativity of social judgments might emerge even in
the context of the current task if participants received additional information about the
novel social categories in question. For example, providing explicit information about the
outgroup status of these categories or the possibility that they would compete for
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resources or status with participants’ ingroup (e.g., Rhodes & Brickman, 2011) might be
sufficient to elicit the same level of prejudice seen in many social psychological studies,
as well as everyday contexts.
9. Conclusion
Further research will be necessary to explore the cognitive processes underlying these
effects, but regardless of the outcome, the present experiments indicate that people’s
judgments about generic statements differ depending on whether the target category is
human or non-human. Generic judgments about human categories do not exhibit the same
negativity bias that generic judgments about non-human categories do.
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Note
1. At the 100% prevalence level, participants (unsurprisingly) showed near-universal
endorsement of the corresponding generic statements, thereby potentially masking
differences by domain and valence. A multiple regression on participants’ truth rat-
ings that excluded the 100% prevalence level yielded the predicted domain 9 va-
lence interaction, b = .05, p = .046. Again, generics involving things were judged
to be true more often when they described threatening (M = 4.49) than non-threa-
tening (M = 4.09) properties, b = .13, p < .001. By contrast, for generics involving
people, there was no significant difference between threatening (M = 4.26) and
non-threatening (M = 4.14) properties, b = .04, p = .25.
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